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Creditors Beware! A Guaranty May Not
Be Such a Guarantee
I. Introduction
The guaranty agreement' has earned its rightful place as an im-
portant component of the commercial world.' One of the fundamen-
tal benefits of the guaranty agreement has been that, despite the on-
set of the debtor's bankruptcy, the creditor may seek repayment
from the guarantor.3 Traditionally, this right to proceed directly
against the guarantor was especially critical because of the auto-
matic stay provision4 of the Bankruptcy Code,' which prohibits a
creditor from taking any action against the principal debtor during
the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding.' In the case of A.H.
Robins Co. v. Piccinin, however, the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals decided that the section 362(a) automatic stay provision may
be applied in certain circumstances to prevent the commencement of
any proceedings against a nonfiling co-debtor, such as a guarantor.
Thus, in certain cases, the creditor may not proceed against either
the bankrupt debtor or the guarantor.
1. A guaranty is an undertaking or promise that is collateral to the primary or principal
obligation and that binds the guarantor to performance in the event of nonperformance by the
principal obligor; a collateral agreement for performance of another's undertaking. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 634 (5th ed. 1979).
2. Kuney, The Bank Guaranty Agreement: The Emerging Threat of the Bankruptcy
Stay, 41 Bus. LAW 77 (1985).
3. id.
4. Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed
under sections 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section
5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C.
78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of-
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or
employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or
proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced
before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a
claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case
under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the
estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case
under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of prop-
erty from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate.
II U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982).
5. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982).
6. See Kuney, supra note 2, at 77.
7. 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 876 (1986).
94 DiCKINSON LAW REVIEW FALL 1989
Part II of this Comment examines the traditional role and pur-
pose of the automatic stay in bankruptcy cases. Judicial reluctance
to extend the automatic stay to protect a nonfiling co-debtor, such as
a guarantor, is examined in Part III. Part IV analyzes and interprets
Robins and its impact upon the traditional guaranty agreement. The
interpretation of Robins by bankruptcy courts is discussed in Part V.
Part VI suggests a drafting solution to the Robins dilemma for guar-
antors. Creditors' concerns, including possible sanctions for violating
the automatic stay provision, are explored in Part VII. Finally, Parts
VIII and IX of this Comment suggest that the extension of the sec-
tion 362(a) automatic stay to guarantors does not comport with
sound business practices, nor does it promote the legislative intent of
the section. More importantly, this Comment recognizes that an ex-
tension of the automatic stay hinders debtors' efforts to secure fi-
nancing through the use of guaranty agreements.
II. Traditional Role and Purpose of the Automatic Stay
Immediately upon the filing of either a voluntary or involuntary
petition for bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Code, a stay arises
that generally bars all debt collection efforts against the debtor or
his estate.' Additionally, the creditor is stayed from pursuing legal
and administrative actions against the debtor, and from undertaking
any act to repossess or even to perfect or enforce any lien.' "In short
upon the filing of the petition the creditor may continue to eat, sleep
and breathe; perhaps he can smile at the debtor, but he may do little
else."1
The section 362(a) automatic stay is one of the fundamental
debtor protections afforded by the Bankruptcy Code.1' The legisla-
tive history of section 362(a) underscores its importance:
[t]he automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor
protections provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives
the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It
stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and all
foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt
a repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be
relieved of the financial pressures that drove him
into bankruptcy. 2
8. See supra note 4.
9. JI. WHITE. BANKRUPTCY AND CREDITORS' RIGHTS 97 (1985).
10. Id.
1I. Murphy, The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 567 (1985-86).
12. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 54-55 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
AUTOMATIC STAY AND GUARANTORS
The automatic stay prevents the diminution or dissipation of the as-
sets of the debtor's estate during the pendency of the bankruptcy
case,18 and enables the debtor to avoid the multiplicity of claims that
may arise against him in different forums. 4 "[The stay] is intended
to prevent a chaotic and uncontrolled scramble for the debtor's as-
sets in a variety of uncoordinated proceedings in different courts."16
The automatic stay also provides protection for creditors. In its
absence, "certain creditors would be able to pursue their own reme-
dies against the debtor's property [and] [t]hose who acted first
would obtain payment of the claims in preference to and to the detri-
ment of other creditors."1 " Bankruptcy is designed to provide an or-
derly liquidation procedure under which all creditors are treated
equally. 17 Traditionally, stays pursuant to section 362(a) were lim-
ited to debtors and did not encompass nonbankrupt co-defendants.' 8
III. Judicial Refusal to Extend the Automatic Stay to Guarantors
Several circuit courts have refused to extend the section 362(a)
automatic stay to nonbankrupt co-defendants, such as guarantors. In
Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association of America v. Butler,'9
the debtor partnership entered into a long term loan agreement with
Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association of America (Teachers),
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5840-41.
13. Paden v. Union for Experimenting Colleges & Univs., 7 Bankr. 289, 290 (N.D. Ill.
1980). This case was decided under the 1898 Bankruptcy Act's automatic stay provision,
which is a carbon copy of the present provision. The court noted that the automatic stay
"should not apply to every action already pending in a non-bankruptcy court to which the
bankrupt is a party." 7 Bankr. at 291 (citing Connell v. Walker, 291 U.S. 1, 5 (1933)). "A
suit which contemplates some relief other than the collection of a scheduled debt is not to be
stayed, as its prosecution would not ordinarily interfere with the bankruptcy proceeding." 7
Bankr. at 291 (citing In re Shenberg, 433 F. Supp. 677, 680 (N.D. I11. 1977)). The Paden
court concluded that the plaintiff's suit should be exempt from the stay, but ruled that the
proper procedure is to seek a lifting of the stay from the bankruptcy court. Id. at 291-92.
14. In re Towner Petroleum Co., 48 Bankr. 182, 185 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1985).
15. Id. at 185 (quoting Fidelity Mortgage Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d
47, 55 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093 (1977)).
16. In re S.I. Acquisition, Inc., 817 F.2d 1142, 1146 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 340 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5787, 5963, 6297).
17. See In re S.I. Acquisition, Inc., 817 F.2d at 1146.
18. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of America v. Butler, 803 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir.
1986). See, e.g.. Fortier v. Dona Anna Plaza Partners, 747 F.2d 1324, 1329-30 (10th Cir.
1984); Williford v. Armstrong World Indus., 715 F.2d 124, 126-27 (4th Cir. 1983); Lynch v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 710 F.2d 1194, 1196-97 (6th Cir. 1983); Wedgeworth v.
Fibreboard Corp., 706 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1983); Austin v. Unarco Indus., 705 F.2d 1, 4-5
(lst Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1247 (1983); Pitts v. Unarco Indus., 698 F.2d 313, 314
(7th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
19. 803 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1986).
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a nonprofit corporation." After both parties filed suit, the trial court
issued a decision in favor of Teachers. 1 The debtor partnership filed
a Chapter 11 petition and sought a temporary restraining order
preventing Teachers from enforcing its judgment against the general
partners of the bankrupt partnership. 2 The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals decided that the section 362(a) automatic stay encompassed
only the debtor partnership and not the individual general partner
defendants who did not declare bankruptcy.2
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to extend
the section 362(a) automatic stay to nonbankrupt co-defendants in
Ingersoll-Rand Financial Corp. v. Miller Mining Co.24 The guaran-
tor in Ingersoll-Rand was the president of the bankrupt debtor,25 a
fact that would weigh very heavily in a case decided under a Robins
interpretation of section 362(a).26 Likewise, in Otoe County Na-
tional Bank v. W & P Trucking, Inc.,27 the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals refused to extend the automatic stay to guarantors of the
bankrupt debtor.2 8 The court left open the possibility that the guar-
antors might seek relief under section 10529 of the Bankruptcy Code.
One of the reasons most often cited for not extending the auto-
matic stay is the legislative history of section 362(a). As enacted, the
Bankruptcy Code contains no explicit provision authorizing stays
against third parties." In Lynch v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,3'
20. Id. at 62.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 62-63.
23. Id. at 65-67.
24. 817 F.2d 1424 (9th Cir. 1987). The court had to decide whether an appeal brought
by the bankrupt debtor could be stayed by the filing of a bankruptcy petition. Id. at 1426. The
court stated that an argument could be made that the language of § 362(a) does not apply to
an appeal brought by the debtor. Id. The court decided that it would stay appeals by the
debtor when the original proceeding was brought against the debtor. Id. The court reasoned
that "section 362 should be read to stay all appeals in proceedings that were originally
brought against the debtor, regardless of whether the debtor is the appellant or appellee. Thus,
whether a case is subject to the automatic stay must be determined at its inception." Id. (quot-
ing Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 711 F.2d 60, 62 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 478
U.S. 1021 (1986)).
25. Ingersoll-Rand, 817 F.2d at 1425.
26. See infra notes 103-106 and accompanying text.
27. 754 F.2d 881 (10th Cir. 1985).
28. Id. at 883.
29. Id. See infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of § 105.
30. In re TRS, Inc., 76 Bankr. 805, 807 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1987). The bankrupt debtor
sought an injunction precluding a creditor, which held a default judgment against the debtor's
principal, from levying and executing on the creditor's judgment against the principal. Id. at
806-07. The court recognized that § 362 does not forbid actions against the bankrupt debtor's
nondebtor principals, partners, officers, employees, co-obligors, guarantors, or sureties. Id. at
807. See, e.g., Otoe County Nat'l Bank v. W & P Trucking, Inc., 754 F.2d 881, 883 (10th Cir.
1985); Fortier v. Dona Anna Plaza Partners, 747 F.2d 1324, 1330 (10th Cir. 1984).
31. 710 F.2d 1194 (6th Cir. 1983).
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the court thoroughly analyzed the legislative history of section
362(a) before deciding that the automatic stay could not be invoked
by a solvent co-defendant of the bankrupt debtor.3 2 The Johns-
Manville court observed that there was nothing in the legislative his-
tory to indicate that the automatic stay should be invoked in a man-
ner that would advance the interest of a third party, such as the
debtor's co-defendant, rather than the debtor or its creditors.33
The Johns-Manville court stated that "[t]he legislative history
of § 362 discloses a congressional intent to stay proceedings against
the debtor, and no other, to preserve the status quo of the estate in
an effort to ultimately effect and implement, to the extent possible, a
successful and equitable reorganization or liquidation."" Addition-
ally, the court observed that "[t]he Notes of the Committee on the
Judiciary identify the debtor as the intended primary congressional
beneficiary of the stay."35 Therefore, the court held that the congres-
sional purpose of section 362(a) would be distorted if a solvent third-
party co-defendant was shielded from creditors by a device intended
for the protection of the insolvent debtor and its creditors. 36
A fundamental rule of statutory construction indicates that in-
clusion in one part of a congressional scheme of that which is ex-
cluded in another part reflects a congressional intent that the exclu-
sion was not inadvertent.37 Courts have acknowledged that the
Bankruptcy Act is a detailed and calculated statutory scheme partic-
ularly appropriate for in pari materia"8 construction. 9 Consequently,
"[siuch a construction of Chapters 11 and 13 of the Code support
[sic] the proposition that Congress did not envision or intend the au-
tomatic stay of proceedings to be available to solvent co-defendants
of a Chapter 11 debtor."4 0 Chapter 13 expressly stays creditors from
32. Id. at 1197-98.
33. Id. at 1197. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text for the legislative history
of the § 362 automatic stay.
34. Id. at 1197 (footnote omitted). See, e.g., Ripley v. Mulroy, 80 Bankr. 17 (E.D.N.Y.
1987).
35. Lynch v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 710 F.2d 1194, 1197 (6th Cir. 1983).
36. Id. See also In re Related Asbestos Cases, 23 Bankr. 523, 527 (N.D. Cal. 1982); In
re UNR Indus., 23 Bankr. 144 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1982).
37. Lynch v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 710 F.2d 1194, 1197 (6th Cir. 1983). See also
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1362 (6th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 994 (1975).
38. In pari materia means upon the same matter or subject. Statutes in pari materia are
to be construed together. "Statutes in pari materia" relate to the same person or thing or have
a common purpose. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 711 (5th ed. 1979).
39. Johns-Manville, 710 F.2d at 1197-98. See In re Bell, 700 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1983)
(construing Chapters 7 and 13 in pari materia); In re Fulghum Constr. Corp., 706 F.2d 171
(6th Cir. 1983) (construing subsections of 11 U.S.C. § 547 in pari materia).
40. Johns-Manville, 710 F.2d at 1198.
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proceeding against co-debtors of the petitioner,4 whereas similar
language is absent from Chapter 11.4 2 The Johns-Manville court
stated that
[n]ot only is the absence of any expansion of the scope [of] the
stay in Chapter 11 probative of congressional intent but, further,
the pronouncement which does appear in Chapter 13 is ex-
tremely limited; it applies only to co-debtors rather than, as in
the action at bar, co-defendants of the petitioner. Accordingly,
in pari materia construction of Chapters 11 and 13 counsel that
Congress did not envision or intend the § 362 stay to be utilized
in a manner other than for the purpose of protecting the debtor
and its estate.4 3
Another frequently cited reason for refusing to extend the sec-
tion 362 automatic stay provision to third parties is that the co-de-
fendants can seek a stay under section 105 of the Code." Section
105 grants courts the power to issue orders necessary or appropriate
to carry out the provisions of Chapter 11. 5 "[N]o clear guidelines
have emerged that may be applied in deciding whether to grant this
extraordinary type of relief.""' Nevertheless, it appears that "some-
41. 11 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (1982) provides that:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, after the
order for relief under this chapter, a creditor may not act, or commence or con-
tinue any civil action, to collect all or any part of a consumer debt of the debtor
from any individual that is liable on such debt with the debtor, or that secured
such debt, unless-
(1) such individual became liable on or secured such debt in the or-
dinary course of such individual's business; or
(2) the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter
7 or II of this title.
42. Lynch v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 710 F.2d 1194, 1198 (6th Cir. 1983).
43. Id. See also Pitts v. Unarco Indus., 698 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1983); In re Related
Asbestos Cases, 23 Bankr. 523 (N.D. Cal. 1982); In re UNR Indus., 23 Bankr. 144 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1982); In re Stay of Proceedings Against Defendants Johns-Manville Corp. &
Unarco Indus., 99 Wash. 2d 193, 660 P.2d 271 (1983) (en banc).
44. In re Related Asbestos Cases, 23 Bankr. 523 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
45. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1982) provides that:
(a) The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title
providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed to
preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any determina-
tion necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to
prevent an abuse of process.
46. In re Arrow Huss, Inc., 51 Bankr. 853, 858 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985). In Arrow an
involuntary Chapter I I petition was filed against the debtor. Prior to the filing, several officers
and employees of the debtor incurred debts on behalf of the debtor, including credit card
charges for corporate business expenses, medical expenses to be paid by the company's em-
ployee benefit plan, and travel and moving expenses incurred at the request of the debtor. The
debtor acknowledged liability for these claims, and filed a motion to extend the protection of
the automatic stay to its officers and employees with respect to claims that might be asserted
against them individually. Id. at 854. The court acknowledged that the § 362(a) automatic
AUTOMATIC STAY AND GUARANTORS
thing more than the mere fact that one codefendant has filed a
Chapter 11 petition must be shown in order to warrant a stay of
proceedings against a nondebtor codefendant.""" Courts must exer-
cise the power to prevent creditors from proceeding against
nondebtors only in extraordinary cases, and not simply to assist the
debtor in reorganizing his business or to relieve general pressure on
the debtor. 8
Several courts have required that the party seeking the section
105 stay must establish that (1) the party will suffer irreparable in-
jury if the stay is not granted; (2) the injury to the party outweighs
any harm that would be inflicted on the defendant by the granting of
the stay; (3) the party is likely to succeed on the merits; and (4) a
stay will not adversely affect the public interest. 49 Clearly, the bur-
den of proof required for a stay under section 105 is far greater than
that required for a section 362(a) automatic stay. Thus, rather than
taking the initiative to seek a stay under section 105, nonbankrupt
co-defendants prefer the automatic stay mechanism of section
362(a).
IV. The Robins Decision
A. H. Robins Company engaged in the manufacturing and mar-
keting of the Dalkon Shield, an intrauterine contraceptive device,
from early 1971 until 1974.50 Robins discontinued manufacture and
sale of the device because of complaints and suits charging that inju-
ries allegedly arose from use of the device.51 Due to the avalanche of
actions filed against it, Robins filed a petition under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code.5 The filing of the Chapter 11 petition auto-
matically stayed all suits against Robins pursuant to section 362(a)
of the Bankruptcy Code.5a Consequently, a number of plaintiffs
sought to sever their actions against Robins and to proceed with
stay does not extend to nondebtor co-defendants. Id. at 856. The court stated that the sole
statutory basis for the issuance of a stay in this case would be § 105. Id. at 856. The court
further noted that the burden is on the debtor to clearly establish the necessity for injunctive
relief. Id. at 858. The court, however, did grant a stay for a period of 45 days. Id. at 859.
47. 51 Bankr. at 858 (citing Royal Truck & Trailer, Inc. v. Armadora Maritima
Salvadorena, S.A., 10 Bankr. 488, 491 (N.D. II. 1981)).
48. 51 Bankr. at 858 (citing In re A.J. Mackay Co., 50 Bankr. 756 (D. Utah 1985)).
49. In re MacDonald/Associates, Inc., 54 Bankr. 865, 868 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1985). See
Auburn News Co., v. Providence Journal Co., 659 F.2d 273, 277 (1st Cir. 1981); Cournoyer v.
Town of Lincoln, 43 Bankr. 354 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1984), affd, 53 Bankr. 478 (D.R.I. 1985);
F.G.M. Associates, Inc., v. City of East Providence, 17 Bankr. 765, 766 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1982).
50. A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 996 (4th Cir. 1986).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. See supra note 4 for the § 362(a) automatic stay provision.
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their claims against the co-defendants, including Aetna Casualty and
Insurance Company (Aetna). 5
Robins responded by seeking injunctive relief restraining the
prosecution of actions against its co-defendants, arguing that its
products liability policy with Aetna was an asset of the debtor's es-
tate in which all plaintiffs and claimants had an interest."5 The dis-
trict court granted Robins' request for a preliminary injunction."
The district judge held that all damage actions that might be satis-
fied from proceeds of the Aetna insurance policy were subject to the
section 362 automatic stay, and enjoined further litigation in the
eight civil actions pursuant to section 362(a), as supplemented by
section 105.57 Several defendants filed timely appeals questioning the
propriety of the injunction as applied to suits by Robins' co-defend-
ants.58 In A. H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin," the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed whether the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to
grant a stay or enjoin suits that are pending in other courts against
co-defendants of the debtor.60
Section 362(a)(1) imposes an automatic stay of any proceeding
"commenced or [that] could have been commenced against the
debtor" at the time of the filing of the Chapter 11 petition. 1 The
Robins court observed that section 362(a)(1) is generally available
only to the debtor, not to third-party defendants or co-defendants.62
Quoting In re Johns-Manville Corp.,63 the Robins court noted that
"there are cases under [362(a)(1)] where a bankruptcy court
may properly stay the proceedings against non-bankrupt co-de-
54. A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 996 (4th Cir. 1986).
55. Id. at 996-97.
56. Id. at 997. In his order granting the preliminary injunction, the district judge found
that (I) continuation of litigation in the civil actions threatened property of Robins' estate,
burdened and impeded Robins' reorganization effort, contravened the public interest, and ren-
dered any plan of reorganization futile; (2) this burden on Robins' estate outweighed any
burden on the Dalkon claimants caused by enjoining their civil actions; and (3) all remaining
insurance coverage in favor of the debtor under its liability policy was property of the Robins'
Chapter 1.1 estate. Id. at 997.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1986).
60. Id. at 998. The court noted that there are four grounds on which the bankruptcy
court may enjoin suits against the bankrupt debtor or its assets and property: (I) II U.S.C. §
362(a)(1); (2) II U.S.C. § 362(a)(3); (3) 11 U.S.C. § 105; and (4) 28 U.S.C. § 1334. Id. at
998-1003.
61. Id. at 998.
62. Id. at 999. The court cited Lynch v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 710 F.2d 1194,
1196-97 (6th Cir. 1983), and Williford v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 715 F.2d 124, 126-27
(4th Cir. 1983), for the rationale underlying this narrow construction. See supra notes 30-43
and accompanying text.
63. 26 Bankr. 405 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
AUTOMATIC STAY AND GUARANTORS
fendants" but, it adds, that in order for relief for such non-bank-
rupt defendants to be available under (a)(l), there must be "un-
usual circumstances" and certainly "[s]omething more than the
mere fact that one of the parties to the lawsuit has filed a Chap-
ter I I bankruptcy must be shown in order that proceedings be
stayed against non-bankrupt parties.""'
The Robins court then stated that this "unusual situation"
would seem to arise "when there is such identity between the debtor
and the third-party defendant that the debtor may be said to be the
real party defendant and that a judgment against the third-party de-
fendant will in effect be a judgment or finding against the debtor." 5
The Robins court noted that "[a]n illustration of such a situation
would be a suit against a third-party who is entitled to absolute in-
demnity by the debtor on account of any judgment that might result
against them in the case.""
This statement appears to indicate that the Robins court would
be willing to extend the automatic stay to a nondebtor guarantor
who has a right to indemnification from the bankrupt debtor by con-
tract or operation of law."' The court analyzed In re Metal Center,
Inc.," Seybolt v. Bio-Energy of Lincoln, Inc.," and In re Brentano's,
Inc.,7" all of which dealt with the application of the automatic stay
in guaranty situations.
In In re Metal Center,71 the third-party plaintiff was sued, along
with the debtor, on his guaranty of the debtor's obligation.72 The
64. A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 999 (4th Cir. 1986). The Johns-
Manville court ruled that
fi]n light of the clear language and legislative history of Section 362(a), the
promulgation of a specific provision to stay proceedings against co-defendants of
Chapter 13 debtors and case law interpretation, this court holds that Section 362
is limited in scope to the debtor and does not operate to stay actions against the
co-defendants of this debtor.
Johns-Manville, 26 Bankr. at 414. The court further stated that § 105 could not be invoked to
extend the stay unless the extension was designed to protect the debtor's interest. Id. at 414-
15. The court further elaborated, stating that "Section 105 of the Code was not intended to
grant the bankruptcy court powers without bounds, and the court's equitable powers thereun-
der are not unrestricted." Id. at 415 (citing In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., 16 Bankr. 1002
(N.D. Ala. 1981); In re Dunckle Assocs., 19 Bankr. 481 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982)).
65. A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 999 (4th Cir. 1986).
66. Id.
67. The Robins decision involved the application of the § 362(a)(I) automatic stay to an
insurer of the bankrupt debtor and not to a guarantor of such debtor. Thus, the portion of the
opinion that discusses the case law dealing with guarantors of the bankrupt debtor is techni-
cally dicta since Aetna was an insurer, not a guarantor.
68. 31 Bankr. 458 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983).
69. 38 Bankr. 123 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984).
70. 27 Bankr. 90 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
71. 31 Bankr. 458 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983).
72. Id. at 459.
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guaranty entitled the third-party plaintiff to be indemnified by the
debtor. 3 While this action was pending, the debtor filed a Chapter
11 petition and the action was stayed as against the debtor. 74 Subse-
quently, the guarantor sought to stay the action against him.7 In
deciding whether to extend the automatic stay to the guarantor, the
court declared that
[w]here . . . a debtor and a nondebtor are so bound by statute
or contract that the liability of the nondebtor is imputed to the
debtor by operation of law, then the Congressional intent to pro-
vide relief to debtors would be frustrated by permitting indi-
rectly what is expressly prohibited in the Code . . . . Clearly,
the debtor's protection must be extended to enjoin litigation
against others if the result would be binding upon the debtor's
estate.76
It is a well settled principle that a guarantor who pays the debt
of his principal has a cause of action against the principal for reim-
bursement.7 Recognizing this principle, the court stated that
[w]hile it might be argued that voluntary payment by a guaran-
tor does not bind the principal debtor where the principal debtor
has objected to the underlying debt, the result is different where
the creditor obtains a judgment against the guarantor. Under
those circumstances, the issue of the validity of the underlying
debt must be litigated and established before the imposition of
such liability, and would have a binding effect upon the princi-
pal debtor in a claim over by the guarantor.
78
Although, in a guaranty situation, the collection of a debt from the
guarantor entitles the guarantor to indemnification from the bank-
rupt debtor, the court held that this situation did not qualify for the
section 362(a)(1) automatic stay because a judgment rendered
against the guarantor would not be binding on the bankruptcy
court.79
73. Id. at 462.
74. Id.
75. 31 Bankr. at 459.
76. In re Metal Center, Inc., 31 Bankr. 458, 462 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983).
77. Id. See Howell v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 69 F.2d 447, 450 (8th Cir. 1934),
cert. denied, 292 U.S. 654 (1934); Scott v. Norton Hardware Co., 54 F.2d 1047, 1050 (4th
Cir. 1932).
78. Metal Center, 31 Bankr. at 462.
79. Id. at 462-63. The court, however, did grant a stay of the action against the guaran-
tor on equitable grounds. The court stated that the debtor would not be bound by any judg-
ment the creditor might obtain against the guarantor. The court reasoned that in the interest
of equity and judicial economy, the issues between the debtor, creditor, and guarantor should
be litigated in the same forum. Id. at 463.
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The Robins court disagreed with the In re Metal Center analy-
sis and concluded that a ruling sustaining the section 362(a)(1) au-
tomatic stay would have been more logical and appropriate. 80 The
Robins court reasoned that
[i]f the indemnitee, who has suffered a judgment for which he is
entitled to be absolutely indemnified by the debtor, cannot file
and have allowed as an adjudicated claim the actual amount of
the judgment he has secured but must submit his claim for al-
lowance in the bankruptcy proceeding with the prospect that his
claim may not be allowed in the full amount of the judgment
awarded in favor of him, the indemnitee will be unfairly
mulcted by inconsistent judgments and his contract of indemnity
in effect nullified."
In Seybolt v. Bio-Energy of Lincoln, Inc.,8" the bankruptcy
court extended the automatic stay to a guarantor who was entitled to
indemnification from the debtor. The court reasoned that "[tjhe con-
cept that notice and an opportunity to defend binds the principal on
a judgment against a guarantor (in a case in which the principal did
not participate) springs from notions of res judicata."83 If the plain-
tiff obtains a judgment against the guarantor, any defense asserted
by the debtor "may well be rendered moot when the guarantor sub-
sequently asserts a claim against it for indemnity." 84 The possibility
of dual litigation in state court and bankruptcy court is not judicially
economic and may expose the debtor to inconsistent judgments.
8 5
In analyzing In re Brentano's, Inc.,"8 the Robins court con-
80. A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 1000 (4th Cir. 1986).
81. Id.
82. 38 Bankr. 123 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984). One of the controversies in this case cen-
tered upon whether the plaintiffs loan to the bankrupt partnership was actually a loan or a
contribution to the capital of the partnership. Id. at 124. The partnership alleged that the
plaintiff's active involvement in the day to day business operations of the partnership resulted
in the plaintiff assuming the liability obligations of a general partner. Id.
83. 38 Bankr. at 128.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 27 Bankr. 90 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983). The controversy in this case centered upon
an attempt by the guarantor of a lease agreement to stay proceedings brought against it by the
lessor. The guaranty served as a security deposit. Id. at 91. The guarantor executed similar
agreements for the bankrupt debtor, thus becoming the debtor's largest unsecured creditor. Id.
The bankruptcy court had to determine whether the suit against the guarantor was related to
the Chapter I I proceeding, thus conferring jurisdiction over the suit against the guarantor on
the bankruptcy court. Id. The bankruptcy court determined that the outcome of this suit and
similar suits against the guarantor would ultimately determine the fate of the debtor's reorgan-
ization effort. Id. at 92. The bankruptcy court stated that only the bankruptcy court had a
global view of the debtor's case and its reorganization efforts. Accordingly, the disposition of
the largest unsecured creditor's claims in the bankruptcy court forum would facilitate the
debtor's efforts to formulate a plan of reorganization. Id.
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cluded that because, under the indemnity agreement, a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff in the guaranty action would automatically re-
sult in indemnification liability against the debtor, the action was in
effect one against the debtor and would qualify for relief under sec-
tion 362(a)(1).8" Additionally, the Robins court observed that even
in the absence of an explicit indemnification agreement, "an action
by a creditor against a guarantor of a debtor's obligation will neces-
sarily affect that that [sic] the creditor's status vis a vis other credi-
tors, and administration of the estate therefore depends upon the
outcome of that litigation."88 The court also discussed the possibility
of granting relief under section 105, section 362(a)(3), and the in-
herent equity powers of the bankruptcy court.89 In a second opinion
87. A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 1000 (4th Cir. 1986). Although the
Brentano's case did not directly involve the application of § 362, the Robins court stated that
the language of the Brentano's court appeared relevant to the issue under review in Robins.
88. 788 F.2d at 1001 (citing Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 995 (3d. Cir. 1984)).
The guarantor in Pacor was not a contractual guarantor, nor had the bankrupt debtor agreed
to indemnify the guarantor, and thus a judgment in the case against the guarantor could not
give rise to any automatic liability on the part of the bankrupt debtor's estate. Pacor, 743 F.2d
at 995.
89. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1001-03. The Robins court observed that § 362(a)(3) stays any
action to obtain possession or to exercise control over property of the estate. Id. at 1001. See
supra note 4 for § 362(a)(3). The court readily acknowledged that the key term in construing
this section is "property." Robins, 788 F.2d at 1001. See infra note 112 for § 541. The court
further stated that an insurance contract embraces the definition of "property" under §
541(a)(1), which defines the term. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1001. See In re Davis, 730 F.2d 176
(5th Cir. 1984). Thus, litigation against an insurer to collect damages under an insurance
policy was stayed by the express language of this section. In re McLean Trucking Co., 74
Bankr. 820, 825 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1987).
As another ground for injunctive relief, the Robins court discussed § 105, which autho-
rizes the bankruptcy court to issue any order that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the
provisions of the Code. 788 F.2d at 1002. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. The court
was careful to limit the circumstances in which § 105 injunctions may be properly issued.
Robins, 788 F.2d at 1003. The court cited In re Otero Mills, Inc., 25 Bankr. 1018, 1020
(D.N.M. 1982) noting that the Otero Mills court approved a ruling that "[t]o so enjoin a
creditor's action against a third party, the court must find that failure to enjoin would effect
[sic] the bankruptcy estate and would adversely or detrimentally influence and pressure the
debtor through the third party." Robins, 788 F.2d at 1003 (quoting In re Otero Mills, Inc., 25
Bankr. 1018, 1020 (D.N.M. 1982)). The Robins court further stated that an injunction would
be proper when the injunction is required to "protect the integrity of a bankrupt's estate and
the Bankruptcy Court's custody thereof and to preserve to that Court the ability to exercise
the authority delegated to it by Congress." Robins, 788 F.2d at 1003 (quoting In re Johns-
Manville Corp., 40 Bankr. 219, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)). See also In re McLean Trucking Co.,
74 Bankr. 800, 825 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1987).
The final possible basis for the granting of an injunction, cited by the Robins court with-
out significant elaboration, was the inherent equity powers of the bankruptcy court. Robins,
788 F.2d at 1003. The court stated that under its comprehensive jurisdiction as conferred by §
1334, the court of appeals has the "inherent power of courts under their general equity powers
and in efficient management of the dockets to grant relief. ... Id. at 1003 (quoting Wil-
liford v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 715 F.2d 124, 127 (4th Cir. 1983)). See supra note 41
and accompanying text. The court cautioned that when invoking these equity powers the court
must weigh competing interests and must justify the stay "by clear and convincing circum-
stances outweighing potential harm to the party against whom it is operative." Robins, 788
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arising from the Robins bankruptcy proceedings, In re A.H. Robins
Co.,90 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Robins
decision.
V. Bankruptcy Courts' Interpretation of the Robins Decision
Lower courts have been inconsistent in applying the portion of
the Robins opinion that addressed the extension of the section
362(a)(1) automatic stay to guarantors of the bankrupt debtor be-
cause the language was technically dicta,91 and arguably unclear.
9 2
An analysis of several lower court decisions highlights this
inconsistency.
In In re Penn Hook Coal Co.," a secured creditor obtained a
default judgment against the debtor and its guarantors. 9' The se-
cured creditor sought to enforce its default judgment by filing a gar-
nishment action against the guarantors.9 5 The creditor argued that
the automatic stay did not extend to the guarantors, and that, there-
fore, the judgment was enforceable against the guarantors.96
Following an in-depth analysis of the Robins decision, the bank-
ruptcy court stated that "[tihe situation was one in which there was
such identity between the Debtor and the third-party defendants
that the Debtor was the real party-defendant. ' 97 The bankruptcy
F.2d at 1003 (quoting Williford, 715 F.2d at 127). See In re McLean Trucking Co., 74 Bankr.
820, 825 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1987).
90. 828 F.2d 1023 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1246 (1988). This case did
not involve the application of section § 362(a)(1) because the complaints expressly excluded
any recovery from Robins' insurance proceeds. Thus, no identity of interests existed between
Aetna, the insurer, and Robins, the debtor. 828 F.2d at 1025. In addition, the plaintiffs stipu-
lated that no discovery would be sought from Robins' executives. Id. The court held that under
§ 105, the action should be stayed against Aetna because the plaintiffs' stipulation could not
prevent Aetna from burdening the executives, officers, and employees of Robins in defending
this suit, thus exhausting the energies of and interfering with the debtor's reorganization. Id.
at 1026.
91. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
92. In re McLean Trucking Co., 74 Bankr. 820, 826 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1987) (The
bankruptcy court stated that it "does not read Robins as standing for any broad principle that
actions against third parties who have resulting indemnity claims against a debtor are always
subject to the automatic stay or must always be stayed pursuant to the discretionary powers of
the court.").
93. 68 Bankr. 804 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1987). The plaintiff initiated suit against the
debtor and guarantors in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York. Id. at 805. Before default judgment was entered against it, the debtor filed a Chapter I 1
petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia. Id.
94. Id. at 805. The default judgment entered against the debtor was in violation of the
automatic stay entered by the bankruptcy court and thus, the default judgment was rendered
void. Id.
95. id.
96. Id. at 808.
97, Id. at 811. See A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 999 (4th Cir. 1986).
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court then stated that "[tihis court will not permit Credit Alliance
[the creditor] to benefit from its wrong by allowing it to pursue the
Debtor, indirectly, by garnishing the salaries of its guarantors,
thereby creating a right to indemnity, when it could not legally pur-
sue the Debtor directly ... "98
The secured creditors appealed the decision, and in Credit Alli-
ance Corp. v. Penn Hook Coal Co.,99 the district court reversed. 100
The court stated that "[b]y its terms, section 362 applies only to
debtors. The Robins case did determine, however, that there are
cases where a bankruptcy court may properly stay the proceedings
against non-bankrupt co-defendants, but it held that such relief was
available only in 'unusual circumstances'." ' The district court then
held that "[t]here are no such unusual circumstances in this case;
thus, section 362 relief should not be extended to the Guarantors."' 02
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Mary-
land, in an unreported opinion, stated that it would construe the
Robins decision literally and stay any action falling within the scope
of Robins.'0 s The unreported case involved a suit against a corporate
president who had guaranteed certain debts of a corporation that
filed for a Chapter 11 reorganization.0 4 The bankruptcy court held
that an identity of interest existed between the debtor (the corpora-
tion) and the debtor's president because the president was not only
the chief executive officer of the corporation, but was also the guar-
antor of certain debts of the corporation. 5 The court stated that the
various factors set forth in the Robins decision were present and con-
cluded that
[tihe unusual circumstances present in the instant case are the
98. In re Penn Hook Coal Co., 68 Bankr. 804, 810-11 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1987).
99. 77 Bankr. 57 (W.D. Va. 1987). The court stated that "the bankruptcy court should
have honored the decision of the federal district court in the Southern District of New York
under the principles of full faith and credit and res judicata." Id. at 58 (citing 28 U.S.C. §
1738 (1982); Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726 (1946); Teachers & Annuity Ass'n of America
v. Butler, 803 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1986)). The Credit Alliance court further elaborated, stating
that "the issues are the same as those that were litigated or could have been litigated in the
previous action. Thus, this court and the bankruptcy court are precluded from litigating those
issues now." 77 Bankr. at 58 (citing Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726 (1946); Teachers Ins.
& Annuity Ass'n of America v. Butler, 803 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1986)). The court observed that
only jurisdictional issues may be raised to collaterally attack a final judgment, and that no
such issues were raised by the appellees. 77 Bankr. at 59.
100. 77 Bankr. at 57 (W.D. Va. 1987).
101. 77 Bankr. at 59 (quoting A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 999 (4th Cir.
1986)).
102. 77 Bankr. at 59.
103. In re Colstan Foods, Inc., No. 86-5-1750 (Bankr, D. Md. May 21, 1987).
104. Id.
105. Id.
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existence of the guarantees and the fact that there are unknown
claims in the wide world which may be filed against the Debtor
and its guarantors. The difficulty this Debtor will have in having
its chief executive officer defend these various claims may well
impair this Debtor's ability to rehabilitate itself. It is beyond
dispute that there is an identity between Pressman, president of
this Debtor corporation in bankruptcy and the Debtor itself,
both as to his employment as the Debtor's chief executive officer
and his legal identity as guarantor.106
By contrast, the court in In re All Seasons Resorts, Inc.,'10 7 nar-
rowly construed the Robins decision. The Chapter 11 debtor brought
suit against a judgment creditor who had obtained a default judg-
ment against the debtor's nondebtor co-defendants, officers of the
debtor corporation. 08 The indemnification provision in the debtor's
corporate bylaws permitted officers and certain other agents of the
debtor to seek reimbursement for the payment of claims and ex-
penses arising out of the performance of their duties on behalf of the
debtor. o9
The bankruptcy court acknowledged that the section 362(a)(1)
automatic stay may be expanded when there is a close identity be-
tween the debtor and the third-party defendant. 10 The bankruptcy
court stated, however, that "[t]o achieve this result, a debtor must
proceed through § 105(a). In other words, the extension of § 362
does not occur automatically in this instance, but requires the filing
of an appropriate adversary proceeding under § 105 and § 362 to
achieve the desired result." ''
The bankruptcy court held that this was not a case of special
circumstances, reasoning that
[ajlthough there is a closeness between debtor and co-defend-
ants by reason of their officer and agent status and their right to
indemnification pursuant to debtor's by-laws, the magnitude of
the harm to debtor if no stay is in force does not approach the
scope of the potential injuries besetting the debtors in Robins
and Johns-Manville.12
106. Id. at 3.
107. 79 Bankr. 901 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987).
108. Id. at 902.
109. Id. at 904-05.
110. Id. at 903.
Ill. Id.
112. In re All Seasons Resorts, Inc., 79 Bankr. 901, 904 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987). It is
of interest that the court addressed the issue of whether the indemnification agreement consti-
tuted property of the estate under § 541 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 541 provides that:
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title
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VI. Is There a Way Around the Robins Decision?
Due to the uncertainty of the reach of the Robins decision, what
measures can creditors take to preserve the value of guaranties? A
possible drafting solution may exist that will allow a creditor to
avoid the Robins decision. A creditor's guaranty agreement may be
modified to provide that, in the event of bankruptcy by the principal
obligor, the guarantor agrees to waive any and all rights to indemni-
fication or reimbursement, whether by operation of law or by con-
tract, against the principal obligor.113 The guarantor may agree to
this because guarantors very rarely rely upon the right to be indem-
nified by the debtor; creditors normally enforce guaranties only when
creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wher-
ever located and by whomever held:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section,
all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the com-
mencement of the case.
(2) All interests of the debtor and the debtor's spouse in community
property as of the commencement of the case that is-
(A) under the sole, equal, or joint management and control of
the debtor; or
(B) liable for an allowable claim against the debtor, or for
both an allowable claim against the debtor and an allowable claim
against the debtor's spouse, to the extent that such interest is so
liable.
(3) Any interest in property that the trustee recovers under sections
329(b), 363(n), 543, 550, 553, or 723 of this title.
(4) Any interest in property preserved for the benefit of or ordered
transferred to the estate under section 510(c) or 551 of this title.
(5) Any interest in property that would have been property of the
estate if such interest had been an interest of the debtor on the date of
the filing of the petition, and that the debtor acquires or becomes entitled
to acquire within 180 days after such date-
(A) by bequest, devise, or inheritance;
(B) as a result of a property settlement agreement with the
debtor's spouse, or of an interlocutory or final divorce decree; or
(C) as a beneficiary of a life insurance policy or of a death
benefit plan.
(6) Proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of or from property
of the estate, except such as are earnings from services performed by an
individual debtor after the commencement of the case.
(7) Any interest in property that the estate acquires after the com-
mencement of the case.
I I U.S.C. § 541 (1982). The bankrupt debtor attempted to analogize an insurance policy to an
indemnification right. All Seasons Resorts, 79 Bankr. at 904. The court stated that an insur-
ance policy is an asset of the debtor because it reflects an obligation of a third party to pay
certain obligations of the debtor. Id. at 904. The indemnification provision in a debtor's bylaws
permits officers and certain other agents of the debtor to seek reimbursement for the payment
of claims and expenses arising out of the performance of duties on behalf of the debtor. Id. at
904-05. The court stated that this indemnification right is a personal right of the agents and
not a property right of the debtor. Id. at 905.
113. Coppel & Renda, Guaranty Agreements Impacted by 4th Circuit Dalkon Deci-
sions, The Daily Rec., May 12, 1988, at 8, col. I [hereinafter Coppel].
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unable to collect from the debtor. 14
Modification of the guaranty agreement may protect creditors.
The reason that Robins extended the automatic stay to the insurer
was the existence of an "identity of interest" between the debtor and
insurer, including the insurer's right of absolute indemnification or
reimbursement from the debtor." 5 Therefore, if a guarantor waives
its right of indemnification or reimbursement against the debtor, it is
arguable that no "identity of interest" exists between the guarantor
and the debtor by virtue of the relationship of guarantor and
principal." 6
A bankruptcy court that is willing to extend the automatic stay
to a guarantor may disagree with this reasoning, alleging that the
congressional intent of the automatic stay would be frustrated if a
suit against a guarantor would adversely affect the success of a
debtor's Chapter II reorganization."" More specifically, if the guar-
antor's involvement is crucial to the debtor's reorganization, a bank-
ruptcy court may be likely to stay suits against the guarantor." 8 A
contrary holding would effectively frustrate the debtor's opportunity
to reorganize in a Chapter 11 proceeding.
The likelihood of success of the drafting solution depends upon
a court's initial willingness to extend the automatic stay to guaran-
tors. If a court tends to view the extension of an automatic stay
broadly, then the language of the guaranty argument may have little
effect on the court's determination, and the automatic stay will likely
be extended to protect the guarantor.
VII. Possibility of Sanctions for Violating the Automatic Stay
Provision
Due to the uncertainty surrounding a bankruptcy court's inter-
pretation and application of the Robins decision, a creditor who pur-
sues a suit against a guarantor after the principal debtor files a
Chapter 11 petition does so at the creditor's own peril. Courts have
routinely held that any action taken in violation of the automatic
stay is void and without effect."19 Thus, if the debtor files a Chapter
11 petition, the creditor can pursue a claim against the guarantor. If
the bankruptcy court subsequently extends the automatic stay under
114. Id.
115. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
116. See Coppel, supra note 113, at 8, col. 1.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., In re Penn Hook Coal Co., 68 Bankr. 804 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1987).
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section 362(a) to the guarantor, the creditor's action is void and
without effect.
The creditor may be faced with a greater problem than voiding
of the action, however. In 1984, Congress added section 362(h) to
the Code. 12 0 Section 362(h) provides that a creditor who "willfully"
violates the automatic stay will be ordered to pay the injured party
actual damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, and, in appropri-
ate circumstances, punitive damages. 21
Prior to the enactment of section 362(h), courts awarded an in-
jured party, usually the bankrupt debtor, the estimated value of em-
ployment lost as a result of the creditor's wrongful action. 22 Addi-
tionally, some courts compensated the injured party for intangible
losses such as mental distress.' 23 Whether compensation for these in-
tangible losses will continue in light of section 362(h) is uncertain.
Clearly, before the creditor pursues a claim against the guaran-
tors of the bankrupt debtor, the creditor must consider the possibility
that sanctions will be awarded against him. Thus, the creditor is
forced to make an economic decision based upon a purely speculative
analysis of whether the court will extend the automatic stay to the
bankrupt debtor's guarantors. The creditor can seek a declaratory
judgment,124 but a declaratory judgment action results in additional
costs that must be borne by the creditor.
VIII. Impact of the Robins Decision Upon Debtors Seeking to Ob-
tain Financing by Utilizing a Guaranty
A guaranty agreement provides that the guarantor will pay the
obligation of the primary obligor if the primary obligor fails to meet
his obligation.'25 A guaranty agreement can be invaluable to a
debtor who is starting a new business and is in need of financing.
The survival of a business venture may depend upon the ability of
the debtor to obtain financing through the use of guaranty agree-
ments. A creditor is more likely to provide financing if the obligation
120. 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (1984).
121. II U.S.C. § 362(h) (1984) provides:
(h) An individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by this
section shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, and, in
appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.
122. In re Batla, 12 Bankr. 397 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).
123. See J.J. WHITE, supra note 9, at 98.
124. A declaratory judgment is a statutory remedy for the determination of a justiciable
controversy when the plaintiff is in doubt as to his legal rights. A binding adjudication of the
rights and status of litigants is provided, even though no consequential relief is awarded.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 368 (5th ed. 1979).
125. See supra note 1.
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of the debtor is endorsed with a guarantee of a third party. Thus, the
guaranty agreement has become a very important component in the
commercial world.
126
The ultimate effect that the Robins decision will have upon the
business world remains speculative. Potential guarantors, debtors,
and creditors, particularly those under the jurisdiction of the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, must consider the ramifications of the de-
cision. The likelihood that a creditor will be stayed from pursuing
the guarantor must be taken into account by all parties to the
obligation.
The Robins court has sent a dangerous message to potential
users of the guaranty agreement. A creditor may not be willing to
extend financing to a debtor who is not financially secure and who is
likely to file for bankruptcy. In the past, the guaranty agreement
alleviated this problem. After the Robins decision, the value of a
guaranty agreement is questionable at best.'27 The purpose of a
guaranty agreement is to substitute the guarantor's indemnity claim
for the creditor's direct claim against the debtor.' 28 Robins simply
discarded this tenet of commercial practice. 29
Simply stated, the Robins decision impairs debtors who are not
financially secure; and financially insecure debtors are the ones that
need the most help. The Robins decision may have detracted from
one of debtors' most important weapons, the guaranty agreement.
Arguably, the Robins court ignored the reasonable expectations
of all parties involved in a guaranty agreement. The guarantor ex-
pects and is obligated to fulfill the obligation of the debtor if the
debtor is unable to fulfill his own obligation. The creditor expects to
proceed with collection efforts against the guarantor if the debtor
does not fulfill his obligation. Finally, the debtor expects that if the
guarantor fulfills the debtor's obligation, the guarantor will pursue
indemnification from the debtor even though "[a]s a practical mat-
ter, guarantors very rarely rely upon their right to be 'indemnified'
by the debtor, since creditors normally enforce guaranties where
they have been unable to collect from the debtor." 30
If the debtor files for bankruptcy, the creditor should receive the
full amount of his claim from the debtor's guarantors. The guaran-
tors, in turn, can seek indemnification from the debtor, "but their
126. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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claim will be treated like any pre-petition, unsecured claim. In all
likelihood, they will not get paid in full." ' a The guarantors, how-
ever, were willing to take this risk when the guarantors signed the
guaranty agreement. This risk is the entire purpose of the guaranty
agreement.
IX. Did Robins Go Too Far?
The Robins decision was, arguably, an example of judicial ac-
tivism at its finest. One author stated that the Robins' result is far
less troublesome than the analytical road the court traveled to reach
the result.1"2 The court could have simply decided the narrow issue
of whether to extend relief to the insurer of the bankrupt debtor, but
chose instead to take a very expansive approach.
The court could have extended relief to the insurer by the tradi-
tional use of section 105.133 Alternatively, the court could have re-
stricted its analysis to whether the insurance policy was property of
the bankrupt debtor under section 362(a)(3)."" The court, however,
chose to discuss section 362(a)(1) in detail, and to analyze several
cases that dealt with guarantors, not insurers.
The Robins holding and reasoning has resulted in confusion and
inconsistency when applied and interpreted by lower courts."3 5
Clearly, the Robins court could have decided the case without dis-
cussing the application of the automatic stay under section 362(a)(1)
to guarantors of the bankrupt debtor. Since the court chose to travel
131. In re All Seasons Resorts, Inc., 79 Bankr. 901, 904 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987). Sec-
tion 502(e) provides that:
(e)(l) Notwithstanding subsections (a), (b), and (c) of this section and par-
agraph (2) of this subsection, the court shall disallow any claim for reimburse-
ment or contribution of an entity that is liable with the debtor on or has secured
the claim of a creditor, to the extent that-
(A) such creditor's claim against the estate is disallowed;
(B) such claim for reimbursement or contribution is contingent as of
the time of allowance or disallowance of such claim for reimbursement or
contribution; or
(C) such entity asserts a right of subrogation to the rights of such
creditor under section 509 of this title.
(2) A claim for reimbursement or contribution of such an entity that be-
comes fixed after the commencement of the case shall be determined, and shall
be allowed under subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section, or disallowed under
subsection (d) of this section, the same as if such claim had become fixed before
the date of the filing of the petition.
II U.S.C. § 502(e) (1982).
132. See Coppel, supra note 113, at 8, col. 1.
133. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 89, 112 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 93-112 and accompanying text for the interpretation and applica-
tion of the Robins decision by bankruptcy courts.
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this path, however, the parties to a guaranty agreement must con-
template the possible ramifications of the Robins decision.
X. Conclusion
The Bankruptcy Code contains no explicit provision authorizing
stays against nondebtor third parties. 3 6 The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals suggested that section 362(a) automatic stays will be ex-
tended to guarantors of the bankrupt debtor. 137 The decision com-
pletely ignored the legislative history of the automatic stay. 138 The
Robins court has sent a dangerous message to potential users of the
guaranty agreement. The debtor may find it difficult to obtain fi-
nancing because the value of a guaranty agreement has been ren-
dered questionable. A creditor must think twice before extending fi-
nancing to a debtor who is financially insecure.
The automatic stay should be extended to guarantors of the
bankrupt debtor in limited circumstances, such as when there is such
a close identity between the debtor and the guarantor that the reor-
ganization of the debtor would be jeopardized by a proceeding
against the guarantor outside the bankruptcy proceeding. The proper
way to extend the stay is to allow the debtor to file a motion for
extension pursuant to section 105. In other words, the extension of
section 362 should not occur automatically, but should require the
filing of an appropriate motion under section 105.39 The debtor
must be made to meet the high burden of proof required under sec-
tion 105.140
The full impact of the Robins decision, as applied to guarantors,
and the application of the section 362(a)(1) automatic stay to guar-
anty situations will likely remain unclear until this matter is ulti-
mately resolved by a subsequent Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
decision.
John J. Lawson
136. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 61-88 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 32-43 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 11I and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.

